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ABSTRACT 
 
The purpose of this study was to analyze the 
structure, conduct, and performance of the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme in oil palm sector. The results 
showed that the conduct of partners in 
partnership generally was in accordance with 
the functions/tasks, rights and obligations 
regulated by the local government on the the 
nucleus estate and smallholder oil palm 
project. The market structure tended to be 
not competitive and the partnership system 
with the nucleus estate and smallholder 
(NES) scheme did not provide similar profits 
where the bargaining position of plasma 
farmers (smallholders) was relatively lower 
compared with that of the business partners 
(nucleus estates). Non-competitive market 
structure did not affect the transaction 
mechanism of Fresh Fruit Bunches (FFB) 
products from plasma plantations to necleus 
estates. 
  
Keywords: conduct, oil palm, nucleus estate 
and smallholder, performance, structure 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The development of oil palm 
plantations in Indonesia has grown rapidly 
since 1970s, especially in 1980s. In 
Indonesia, there are three performers in oil 
palm plantations, namely State-Owed 
Plantation (PBN), Private-Owed Plantation 
(PBS) and Smallholder Plantation (PR). Data 
from the Directorate General of Plantation 
(2011) indicated that in 1980 the total area of 
oil palm plantations was 294,560 ha and in 
2010 8,385,394 ha, of which 52.07 percent 
was owned by Private-Owed Plantations, 
40.39 percent by Smallholder Plantations, 
and 7.54 percent by State-owed Plantations 
(Appendix 4). In the period of 1980 - 2012, 
the average growth of palm oil production per 
year was 10.13 percent; in 2006 the highest 
growth rate was 31.64 percent and in 2009 
the lowest growth was -0.71 percent. 
The implementation of partnership 
cooperation in the nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) scheme in oil palm sector 
still encounters many problems and 
obstacles, either before or after the 
conversion period. The period before the 
conversion is the critical time because the 
plants are generally immature and the 
plantation status is still under the nucleus 
estates’s ownership. Basically, the obstacles 
facing plasma farmer households can be 
internal or external. The internal obstacles 
include (1) the low ability of farmers to 
develop their own products, (2) the low 
professionalism of farmers as plasma 
plantation managers, and (3) the lack of 
capital and low mastery of technology. The 
external obstacles are associated with (1) the 
business climate which is not good, (2) 
government policies which are not conducive 
and appropriate, (3) plantation facilities which 
are inadequate, especially transportation 
infrastructure, and (4) management 
coaching, training and extension which have 
not been optimal. 
The purpose of this study was to 
analyze the structure, conduct, and 
performance of the the nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) scheme in oil palm sector. 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
 
Data used in the study were secondary 
data, namely cross section and time series 
data. Cross section data were obtained from 
the survey by the research team of the 
Department of Agricultural Socio-Economics, 
Faculty of Agriculture, University of Lambung 
Mangkurat in 2016. Tanah Laut Regency 
was purposively selected based on the 
consideration that the regency had the most 
projects of nucleus estate and smallholder 
(NES) in oil palm to implement. Furthermore, 
two plantations, which implemented the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme in oil palm, were intentionally 
chosen. From each plantation, two sample 
villages were chosen (10 villages). From 
each village, 30 households of farmer models 
were then taken. 
The analysis model was used to 
analyze the structure, conduct and 
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performance and policy strategies in 
developing the nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) scheme in oil palm sector 
with the aid of SCP analysis. 
Data analysis methods used in this 
study referred to the method used by 
Firdaus, et al. (2008). These methods were 
classified into three groups, namely analysis 
of industrial structure, industrial conduct, and 
industrial performance. However, due to a 
lack of data, only the relevant methods were 
used in the analysis. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
Structure, Conduct and Performance of 
the Nucleus Estate and Smallholder (NES) 
scheme in Oil Palm Sector 
The structure, conduct, and 
performance of oil palm plantations in 
Indonesia cannot be separated from the 
linkage between upstream and downstream 
industrial plantations, so the analysis of the 
structure, conduct, and performance of oil 
palm plantations with the scheme of 
partnership system of nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) can use the criteria of 
backward linkages and forward linkages 
(Arifin, 2000). Performance of plantation 
industry depends on the ability of the 
performers to combine traditional activities in 
the upstream sector with the modern 
activities in the downstream sector. Usually 
the upstream sector is highly dependent on 
natural conditions whereas the downstream 
sector involves technology. The government 
should create a regulation which allows 
plantation industry performers to improve 
their plantation performance through various 
facilities like building various infrastructures 
and establishing conducive working 
environment (Daihani, 2000). 
Becoming the participants in the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) oil 
palm project basically becomes the 
participants of partnership between 
smallholders as the plasma farmers and 
large plantations as the nucleus. To become 
plasma participants, farmers must meet 
some requirements that have been 
determined by local governments based on 
the instructions of the Directorate General of 
Plantation, Jakarta. Institutional system in the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme has been agreed by both parties 
when signing the loan agreement on giving 
the management of plasma plantation 
(conversion) from the nucleus estates to 
smallholders. The institutional system in the 
form of rules on the rights and obligations that 
must be obeyed by each participant in the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme is regulated in the South Sumatra 
Regional Regulation No. 17 of 1998. 
When partnership participants 
(plasma and nucleus) do not comply with the 
rules, they can be sued with the sanctions in 
accordance with Chapter XIV of Article 37 on 
the Criminal Provisions and Chapter XV of 
Article 38 on the Investigators Regulation. 
Furthermore, the structure and conduct of 
these partnership performers are based on 
duties, obligations and rights set out in the 
partnership agreement. This guide is a 
reference for project performers of the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) to 
behave as the participants in the nucleus and 
smallholder oil palm project. This conduct 
affects the performance of the nucleus estate 
and smallholder (NES) project as a whole. 
In accordance with the concept of 
economic institution and the structure-
conduct-performance (S-B-P concept), as 
well as local government regulations above, 
the assessment of economic performance of 
oil palm plantations with the nucleus and 
smallholder (NES) scheme was studied 
based on the conduct of individual performer 
in NES, especially the conduct of plasma 
farmer households at every stage of 
activities, such as (1) land preparation and oil 
palm production in plasma plantations, and 
(2) oil palm marketing. 
 
Land Preparation and Oil Palm Production 
in Plasma Plantations 
The activities in the preparation stage 
and construction of plasma plantations are 
carried out by the nucleus until the plants are 
4 years old (from planting the seedlings to the 
production). The activities include (1) the 
clearing and preparation of plasma plantation 
land, (2) nursery, (3) planting the seedlings 
and the soil cover plants, and (4) plant 
maintenance. 
According to Hayami (2001), the 
plantation development requires a big initial 
capital, especially for the construction of 
infrastructure and therefore should be done 
by a company with a large-scale enterprise. 
The activities of clearing the lands and 
building infrastructure in oil palm plantations 
generally use the fund sources from outside 
the company. The fund sources vary 
depending on the type of project performed 
by the nucleus estate and smallholder (NES). 
The nucleus estate and smallholder project 
with a special system (NES-Sus) is financed 
by state revenue budgetary and expenditure 
(APBN) and foreign aid (World Bank), the 
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nucleus estate and smallholder project for 
transmigration (NES-Trans) by the state 
revenue budgetary and expenditure (APBN), 
while the nucleus estate and smallholder 
project for small business (NES-KUK) by the 
state revenue budgetary and expenditure 
(APBN) or local revenue budgetary and 
expenditure (APBD). 
The value of loans charged to plasma 
farmer households reflects the cost of the 
initial investment for opening plasma 
plantations and other supporting facilities. 
The cost components expensed as credit 
values include the costs for opening the 
plasma plantations until the plants produce, 
the cost for clearing the lands and building 
the production road around the plasma 
plantations. 
During the pre-conversion period 
(before the plants reach 4 years old or when 
they are not yet productive), the 
management of plasma plantations becomes 
the responsibility of the nucleus whereas the 
farmers just become the employees and they 
are paid per working day, and the cost of 
payment is calculated as one component of 
the farmers’ debts. In order to earn the 
additional family income, the farmers 
generally cultivate their yards and fields for 
food crops. 
After the plants are able to produce 
(approximately at the age of 4 years old), the 
project party of the nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) makes an assessment on 
the plantation condition to find out whether it 
is eligible to convert the management of the 
the plantations to plasma farmers 
(conversion). The conversion is done when 
the plantations are able to produce so that 
the farmers can earn income and are able to 
repay the loans in installments. The plasma 
plantations are declared to be eligible when 
the conditions of the plantations are good (in 
category A), which can be seen from the 
number of trees per plot (about 2 hectares) 
with a minimum number of 240. 
If the number of palm trees in plasma 
plantations is less than the standard number, 
the conversion of plasma plantations is 
delayed, and the improvement of the 
plantations should be carried out. The 
decreasing number of palm trees in plasma 
plantations generally due to pests (especially 
the wild pigs), disease and lack of 
maintenance on plants aged less than two 
years and no immediate replanting. 
After the conversion stage (year 4 to 
year 6), it is followed by the stage of 
development and supervision of plants by the 
nucleus and procurement of inputs and sale 
of the crops with the help of cooperative 
services. At this stage, the maintenance of 
plasma plantations is fully under the 
responsibility of plasma farmers. To facilitate 
the payment of the loans, the farmers must 
become bank customers individually and 
become members of farmer 
groups/cooperatives. 
At the stage of the post-conversion to 
the debt repayment (after the sixth year), the 
nucleus estates still conduct training either 
on production, harvest or post-harvest. At 
each scheduled harvest activity, the fresh 
fruit bunches (FFB) are collected and 
transported by trucks belonging to the 
nucleus or cooperative to oil palm mills 
owned by the nucleus. All transactions are 
represented by farmer organization boards 
(farmer groups or cooperatives), and the 
plasma farmers receive the earnings from the 
sale of oil palm fruit every month. The 
cooperatives also help providing extentions, 
setting up the working groups, and securing 
the FFB price. 
The components of transaction costs 
which have the largest share are the 
transportation cost, distance from plasma 
plantations to oil palm mills, condition of 
roads in the plantations, and the condition of 
conveyance which is an important 
determinant of the transport cost. The means 
of transport used to transport fress fruit 
bunches from plasma plantations to the mills 
are trucks and pick-up cars. Harvesting and 
transporting are done according to schedule, 
usually started in the morning and completed 
in the afternoon. 
The oil palm age is a determining 
factor for CPO which in turn will determine 
the selling price of fresh fruit bunches. The 
Minister of Forestry and Plantation (2000), 
determined the selling price of the farmers’ 
fresh fruit bunches based on the age of the 
plant; the price of fresh fruit bunches from the 
plants with the ages ranging from 5 to 9 years 
is slightly varied and lower than that from the 
plants with ages ranging from 10 to 20 years. 
Based on the financial/economic 
eligibility criteria, all plasma plantations still 
have an R/C worth more than one and a 
positive B/C. The calculation costs on these 
criteria do not include the amount of loan 
installment paid by the plasma farmers, but 
only include the cost components that are 
directly related to the activities in plasma 
plantations in order to truly reflect the 
performance of farmer households. 
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Oil Palm Marketing 
The marketing of fresh fruit bunches is 
tied to an agreement or contract declaring 
that the farmers must sell the products they 
produce to their partners (the nucleus), and 
the nucleus has an obligation to purchase at 
least 75% of the fresh fruit bunches from 
plasma plantations. The analysis of the 
marketing is reviewed through four aspects, 
namely (1) the distribution system, (2) market 
structure, (3) market conduct, and (4) market 
performance. 
 
Market Structure   
The market structure is a characteristic 
of organizing the product market, which 
strategically effect the competition and the 
establishment of market prices. According to 
Martin (1994), there were four important 
elements that could be used as a reference 
for determining the market structure of a 
product, namely (1) the concentration level of 
the sellers or the buyers, (2) the product 
differentiation, and (3) the presence or 
absence of obstacles in a business. 
The concentration level of the 
sellers/buyers reflects the market players' 
bargaining power either as the sellers or 
buyers. The higher the concentration level of 
market players the stronger its position as a 
determinant of the price of a product. In the 
market of fresh fruit bunch products with the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme, the sellers are the number of farmer 
households who face the nucleus estates as 
the buyers.  
When it is viewed from the area of 
plasma plantations collectively (business 
scale), it is generally larger than the business 
scale of the nucleus plantations. The 
relatively wide plasma plantations are owned 
by many farmers, around 3,000 to 4,000 
farmer households, and they are difficult to 
manage at the time of the transaction. The 
concentration of transactors is precisely 
available on the buyer (the nucleus 
plantation) because there is only one nucleus 
that has one or more oil palm mills in each 
location of plasma plantations. 
Ownership of oil palm mill as a 
nucleus-specific assets and palm fruit 
characteristics of plasma plantations that 
must be processed become the determining 
factor of bargaining position of oil palm 
market participants. This condition will 
automatically make the nucleus as a single 
buyer and the price maker. Although there 
are other buyers (non-nucleus), the 
transaction with them is very rarely done 
(illegal), and therefore the nonnucleus buyers 
do not become the important competitors in 
the marketing of oil palm products in the 
nucleus estate and smalholder (NES) 
project. 
Pricing mechanism of fresh fruit 
bunches on the location of plasma 
plantations for all systems of the nucleus 
estate and smallholder (NES) tends to be 
uncompetitive in which a single buyer 
(nucleus) deals with many sellers (farmers). 
The economic institutions (cooperatives or 
farmer groups) that should become the 
places for the plasma farmers (as the sellers) 
to negotiate with the nucleus (as the buyer) 
have not functioned optimally. The farmer 
institution only serves as an intermediary in 
the product marketing and has not been able 
to represent farmers in the transaction with 
the nucleus. 
The thing that should get attention is 
that the price level of fresh fruit bunches 
determined on the price formula by the 
Ministry of Forestry and Plantation in 1998 
should result in the competitive purchase 
price of fresh fruit bunches in order to avoid 
the sale of fresh fruit bunches out of the 
official channel (suitable with the contract). 
Farmers always look for information of higher 
selling prices of fresh fruit bunches because 
the price information can be accessed in the 
market quite well by farmers either by radio 
or cellular phone. Basically, the price 
guidelines set by the government simply set 
the average price as a "minimum price" to be 
paid by the nucleus when they buy fresh fruit 
bunches from the farmers.   
Basically, the formula price set by the 
Ministry of Forestry and Plantation in 1998 
and 2000 aimed to preserve the 
effectiveness of the partnership between the 
nucleus estates and plasma farmers 
because it can (1) reduce the impact of 
fluctuations in the price of palm oil from the 
world market and domestic for one month on 
the price level of fresh fruit bunches in the 
farmer level, (2) assess the quality of plasma 
plantations based on overlay so that the 
quality of fresh fruit bunches is more uniform 
and the unity of members of farmer groups is 
maintained, and (3) enable the farmers to 
have certainty about the fresh fruit bunches 
sale because according to the contract, the 
nucleus is required to buy fresh fruit bunches 
from farmers at a minimum of 75.00% of the 
oil palm mill capacity. 
According to the results of the study by 
Mulyana (2003) in Laily (2007), the selling 
price set by the government has basically 
reduced "the exploitation of the plasma 
farmers by the nucleus”. If the government 
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does not regulate the selling price of fresh 
fruit bunches in plasma plantations, the 
purchase price of fresh fruit bunches from the 
farmers is only 71.67% of the price set by the 
government. Based on the equation 
estimation of production conduct, a selling 
price factor is essential to the increasing 
productivity of plasma plantations because 
the effect of price changes in fresh fruit 
bunches on the productivity is very significant 
even though the productivity of fresh fruit 
bunches toward the price of fresh fruit 
bunches is unresponsive (inelastic). The 
increase in fresh fruit bunch price is expected 
to motivate farmers to manage their 
plantations in better ways. The results of the 
simulation also show that the impact of rising 
price of fresh fruit bunches with a smaller 
percentage (15.00%) compared to the rising 
input price of variable with a greater 
percentage (20:00%) still gives a positive 
impact on the performance of farmer 
households, especially on the productivity of 
plasma plantations, oil palm revenue and 
income, and acceleration of credit payment 
period. 
 
Product Differentiation 
One way to distinguish the product 
price is by changing the product 
differentiation, either through processing or 
other marketing functions. In general, the oil 
palm fruits, such as fresh fruit bunches, sold 
by the farmers have relatively homogeneous 
characteristics so the farmers are not able to 
determine the different selling prices. Product 
differentiation can only be done when the 
fresh fruit bunches are processed to obtain 
value added, i.e. into palm oil or other 
processed products, but the investment costs 
of oil palm mill construction are very 
expensive so the farmers cannot do it 
individually or collectively. 
In addition, some characteristics of 
fresh fruit bunches and the partnership 
agreement in the nucleus estate and 
smallholder (NES) scheme tend to inflict a 
financial loss to farmers, such as (1) the 
product cannot be consumed directly or sold 
to final customers, (2) the product is easily 
damaged and must be processed within 12 
hours, (3) the product is bulky and requires a 
special transport means, and (4) the product 
should be sold to the oil palm mill owned by 
the nucleus. These characteristics of fresh 
fruit bunches and the partnership agreement 
in the nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme have resulted in the farmer 
incapability to store the product to obtain time 
utility, to process their own products to gain 
form utility, and to sell the products to another 
location to get place utility. These 
characteristics make the farmers’ bargaining 
position weaker in each transaction, so the 
position of plasma farmers tends just to 
become the price takers. 
 
Obstacles in business 
Some sources of obstacles in 
business are the existence of positive profits 
as the result of product differentiation, and 
the difference in the level of superiority of one 
manufacturer to another as the result of 
differences in business scale. Each plasma 
farmer has the same position in terms of 
rights and obligations as the participant of the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES), the 
relatively equal business scale (two 
hectares) and the same marketing manner 
and channels for the product marketing, so 
the competition among plasma farmers 
based on business scale does not happen. 
Although it requires special conditions 
in order to become a participant in the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme, the small-scale business does not 
become an obstacle for smallholders to join 
the partnership system available in the 
research site. The government policy that 
opens the opportunity for smallholder 
plantations to join the partnership system by 
giving the easy access to the oil palm 
industry will generate business profit that is 
relatively small or close to zero, resulting in 
the free entry and exit into industry. 
Based on the above details, the 
structure of the oil palm market tends to be 
uncompetitive, where a lot of sellers (plasma 
farmers) face a buyer (the nucleus), and the 
bargaining position is not balanced or in 
other words the nucleus is relatively 
stronger than the plasma farmers so the 
nucleus tends to affect the price of the 
products (price maker) and plasma farmers 
tend to become the price takers. In addition, 
the government intervention in determining 
the selling price and providing the 
information of the selling price which is not 
symmetrical has strengthened the 
uncompetitive market structure. 
 
Market Conduct 
Market conduct is a variety of activities 
or methods adopted by the market makers in 
the adjustment of its activities to market 
conditions. Plasma farmers, as the product 
sellers, have cooperation among farmers in 
farmer groups, and some farmer groups join 
the cooperatives, such as oil palm producer 
cooperatives (KPKS) or village unit 
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cooperatives (KUD). Furthermore, the 
conduct of farmers in selling products 
whether through official or unofficial channels 
is usually based on economic and non-
economic considerations. 
The sale of fresh fruit bunches from 
plasma plantations to the nucleus after the 
loan payment aims to prepare the plantation 
rejuvenation process for some of the funds 
deducted from the value of fresh fruit bunch 
sales after the credit payment is used for 
insurance funds of plantation rejuvenation (in 
the form of Idapertabun insurance). When all 
of the agreement is met by the partnership 
performers (plasma farmers and nucleus 
estates), the partnership system will run 
better and the continuity of cooperation within 
the nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme will be maintained. 
The conduct of cooperative as a forum 
for farmers helps schedule the harvest, 
transport, and record the number of fresh fruit 
bunches from the farmers sold to the 
nucleus, and then distribute the earnings of 
fresh fruit bunches to farmers based on the 
number of products registered through 
farmer groups at the beginning of each 
month. To compensate these services, the 
cooperative board obtains the commission in 
the form of the cost for transport when 
vehicles for the transport are owned by 
cooperatives, and the commission for the 
management fee that is paid by each plasma 
farmer based on the unit of products. 
 
Market Performance 
Dimensions that are often used in 
assessing the market performance are the 
level of efficiency, relationship of selling price 
and the producer cost, and promotional costs 
(Bain, 1959 in Martin, 1994), efficiency, profit, 
quality and market prices (Carlton and 
Perloff, 1994). 
The level of business efficiency is 
strongly influenced by the business scale; the 
greater the business scale (to some extent), 
the more efficient it will be. In general, the 
market performance of oil palm in the 
location of plasma plantations in the nucleus 
estate and smallholder (NES) scheme is still 
profitable for farmers or still efficient because 
the profit per unit of product is still positive. 
The third alternative model proposed 
by Tambunan (1996) is that the farmers' 
economic institutions should deal with large 
estates (the nucleus) through the way where 
farmer households join the cooperative 
institution as a single seller facing the 
nucleus as a single buyer. If this can be 
realized, the market structure is going to 
approach a bilateral monopoly. This can be 
done when the farmer institutions (farmer 
groups, oil palm producer cooperatives 
(KPKS) or village unit cooperatives (KUD) is 
empowered in terms of management, 
technology, and capital. If the model of 
bilateral monopoly can be realized, the price 
of the product is the result of the negotiation 
between both parties for a transaction with 
relatively equal bargaining power.  
The role of the government for the 
realization of the market structure is 
indispensable, with the improvement of 
pricing system, such as (1) the pricing should 
be determined more frequently e.g. every 
week if it is possible every day instead of 
once in a month, (2) the pricing should be 
more transparent, especially in determining 
yield (R) and K factor with the involvement of 
farmer institutions, (3) the determination of R 
should be based on the smaller plantation 
area to make it more representative, and (4) 
the waiting period of payments for fresh fruit 
bunches to farmers should be shortened and 
when possible in cash so that the farmers are 
not "trapped" with debts by traders due to 
lack of cash. 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTION 
 
Conclusions 
The conduct of partnership performers 
generally has been in accordance with the 
functions/tasks, rights and obligations 
regulated by the local government on the 
nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) oil 
palm project. 
The market structure tends to be not 
competitive and the partnership system with 
the nucleus estate and smallholder (NES) 
scheme has not provided equal profits where 
the bargaining position of farmers is relatively 
lower than its partner (the nucleus) and the 
role of farmer economic organizations 
(cooperatives) has not been as expected. 
The market structure which is not competitive 
affects the transaction mechanism of the 
fresh fruit bunches from plasma plantations 
to the nucleus estate. 
Based on some technical criteria 
(conversion age, productivity, and loan 
payment period) and financial/economic 
criteria, the performance of plasma 
plantations is quite good. 
 
Suggestion 
The market structure which is not 
competitive affects the transaction 
mechanism of fresh fruit bunches from 
plasma plantations to the nucleus estates. 
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The transaction of products which is based 
on the fresh fruit bunches pricing still has 
some weaknesses, which makes the farmers 
tend just to become the price takers. If the 
farmer organizations (cooperatives and 
farmer groups) are more empowered to 
improve their bargaining power, the level of 
selling prices of fresh fruit bunches is 
expected to be higher and more profitable for 
the farmer households. Overall, the market 
performance is still efficient, reflected by the 
positive profit level of plasma farmers. 
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